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Abstract: As part of an international research project on reservoir fisheries productivity in developing 
countries, this paper examines contractual relations in the Lake Nasser fishery, seeking to understand 
why so many seemingly redundant contract types coexist and what effect they have on productivity. 
Based on the results of a socio-economic survey conducted in the fishery and drawing on the literature on 
agricultural sharecropping and share remuneration systems in fisheries, the paper analyses the roles of 
the different contracts observed in the Lake Nasser fishery. In particular, it discusses the incentives, 
limitations, and opportunities that these contracts offer to the different groups of actors (gear owners, 
license owners, crew members), and shows how these arrangements influence and shape the fishing 
strategies, capital mobilisation, and ultimately labour productivity of those different groups. While the 
debate on share contracts generally seeks to assess their efficiency relative to other types of contracts, 
this paper argues that the relevant question is not how efficient the contracts are, but what functions are 
served by the various co-existing contracts, and why different actors may choose each type.  While the 
standard explanations of risk management and the impossibility of close supervision seem to provide 
some insight into this, it is also clear that the actors in the fishery use these contracts to mobilise capital 
and combine productive resources with other actors.  This interlinking is a key function of the contracts, 
and the diversity of resource endowments and needs of the different actors helps explain the diversity of 
contract types. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Lake Nasser fishery came into existence in 1961 with the construction of the Aswan High Dam and 
the subsequent creation of Lake Nasseri. Rich in sedimentii and thus in food, the waters of Lake Nasser 
support an abundant fish population (Latif, 1974). Production is currently only one quarter of what has 
been estimated to be its potential, with official landings fluctuating around 20,000 tiii, worth an estimated 
US$17 million per year (Béné, Bandi, and Durville, 2008). Tilapia (Oreochromis Niloticus) is the most 
common species and represents about 80 per cent of official catches. In addition, Nile perch (Lates 
Niloticus), tiger fish (Hydrocynus Goliath) and Alestes spp. are also important for the fishery (Latif, 1974; 
Rashed, 2005). While tilapia and Nile perch are sold fresh (along with other minor species), tiger fish and 
Alestes are usually processed by fishers before being sold as salted fish. 
 
The fishery expanded rapidly, with production increasing from few hundred tonnes in 1965 to a peak of 
34,206 t in 1981. As the fishery grew in the 1970s, it attracted increasing interest from local people and 
thousands of migrants from around the country, and the number of fishers on the lake increased rapidly. 
A system of boat licenses was introduced by the central government to control access to the fishery and 
reduce potential for conflicts. While licenses were issued initially on the basis of boat ownership, they 
could also be sold or exchanged. Some people managed to acquire dozens of licenses through this 
‘market’, with the largest license holder now owning 154. By the time the sale of licenses was prohibited 
and the total number fixed at 3000, over half of the licenses belonged to non fishers. As a result, the main 
factors of production necessary to operate in the fishery – licenses, boats, gear, and labour power – are 
often possessed by different actors. Non fishing license holders act as ‘license lords’, leasing their licenses 
out to ‘roasa’ (fishing camp bosses) in exchange for either fixed cash rent or a share of the catch. These 
roasa, along with those roasa who own license(s), recruit labourers to live in their camps and work as 
crew on a seasonal basis. Far from being ‘just’ rental or labour contracts, these arrangements serve 
several other functions, including mobilising capital despite weak credit markets, managing risk, 
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providing incentives for higher production, and combining factors of production such as labour power, 
licenses, and fishing equipment.  
 
As part of a larger international research project on reservoir fisheries productivity in developing 
countries, this paper seeks to shed light on the different types of contracts in the Lake Nasser fishery. 
Drawing on the existing literature on agricultural sharecropping but also on the (scarcer) literature on 
share remuneration systems in fisheries, it analyses the diverse functions served by the different 
contractual relations found in the Lake Nasser fishery, arguing this diversity of contractual arrangements 
is more likely to be a reflection of the varied resource endowments and needs of different fishers than an 
indication that some of them have more efficient contracts than others. In particular, it discusses the 
incentives, limitations, and opportunities that different contract types hold for fishers, and show how 
these influence and shape fishing strategies, capital mobilization, and ultimately labour productivity. The 
paper calls into question the ability of common explanations such as risk and moral hazard to fully 
account for the pervasiveness of sharecropping, and suggests that its persistence may instead be 
explained instead by its ability to enable different actors, endowed with different but complementary 
assets and resources, to combine those resources and put them to productive use.  
 
2. The Lake Nasser Fishery 
 
The analysis presented here derives from a socioeconomic survey carried out on the shore of Lake Nasser 
between January and May 2007 with the help of the Lake Nasser Development Authority (LNDA). One 
hundred and twenty five fishers were interviewed during this survey. The data collected included basic 
demographic information regarding family size, migratory status, age, and fishing history; employment 
details, including number of licenses, revenue sharing arrangements, affiliations to cooperatives, and 
engagement in other economic activities; and details of fishing activity, including production data, 
estimated operating costs, and information on boat and gear ownership. Table 1 summarises some of this 
information.  
 
Table 1: Selected characteristics of Lake Nasser fishers (Std. Dev. in brackets) 
   Owners Renters Partners Labourers Total 
Household size (# of people) 10.2 
 (8) 
6.7 
(3.4) 
9.4 
(4.8) 
7.9  
(2.4) 
9.2  
(6) 
Age (years) 45 
(12.8) 
33 
(9.6) 
42  
(12.9) 
38  
(11) 
41  
(12.7) 
Educated 44% 60% 40% 15% 41% 
Has migrated 98% 90% 88% 100% 95% 
Member of co-op 64% 30% 28% 15% 42% 
Number of licenses 4 
(1.17) 
7 
(3.39) 
8  
(2.95) 
1 5  
(1.07) 
Annual catch per boat (tonnes) 4790 
(4056.6) 
3872 
(3900.3) 
4133 
(3025.4) 
6177 
(3654.3) 
4716 
(3587.2) 
Owns boat(s) 98% 70% 80% 0% 72% 
Owns gear 98% 80% 86% 0% 75% 
 
Far from comprising a homogenous and coherent social group, the majority of the individuals involved in 
the Lake Nasser fishery are seasonal, unsettled workers from different parts of the country. They operate 
from temporary fishing camps established along the 7800 km of the lake’s shorelines. With no electricity, 
running water or access to public services, living conditions in these remote camps are rough. Only male 
fishers live there, staying in rudimentary cane shelters for up to seven months.  
 
Four main types of gear are operated in the Lake Nasser fishery: duk (trammel nets), kobok (bottom 
gillnets), sacarota (floating gillnets), and sinnar (longlines) – Table 2. Trammel nets and bottom gillnets 
are used primarily for tilapia, floating gillnets to catch tiger fish and Alestes for salting, and longlines to 
target Nile perch (Barranaia, 2000). Trammel nets and bottom gillnets are the most common gears on the 
lake, with all fishers using trammel nets and 95 per cent using bottom gillnets. While there is some 
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variation in price between nets of different sizes and materials, both of these types of gear average 
around 200 Egyptian Pounds (EGP, roughly USD $36), while floating gillnets are more expensive. Hooks 
for longlines average EGP 0.8 each, and are made into lines of approximately 100 hooks, including the 
cost of the line and labour, for EGP 100 (USD $18). 
 
Table 2: Overview of common fishing gear (Std. Dev. in brackets) 
Gear Local 
name 
Target Lifetime 
(months) 
Fishing operation 
(hours) 
Mean cost 
(EGP) 
Floating 
Gillnet 
Sacarota Tiger fish & 
Alestes spp. for 
salting 
6 - 12 24 261 (183) 
Trammel 
Net 
Duk Tilapia & some 
Nile perch 
2 1 193 (112) 
Bottom 
Gillnet 
Kobok Tilapia, some Nile 
perch, others 
(catfish, etc) 
3 12 213 (130) 
Longline Sinnar Nile perch 6 - 12 24 100  (90) 
 
3. Share contracts in Lake Nasser 
 
Historically much of the debate on share contracts has revolved around their efficiency relative to other 
types of contract, with generations of economists seeking explanations for their apparently anomalous 
persistence (Smith, 1776; Marshall, 1890; Schickele, 1941; Johnson, 1950; Cheung, 1969; Bardhan and 
Srinivasan, 1971; Reid, 1987). Arguments were made and refuted about the efficiency (or inefficiency) of 
sharecropping, the incentives (or disincentives) it provides for inputs and outputs by the different 
parties, its compatibility (or incompatibility) with capitalism, and possible explanations for its 
pervasiveness across time and space. 
 
While share contracts are still common in agriculture in some parts of the developing world, they are also 
ubiquitous in fishing (Zoeteweij, 1956; Sutinen, 1979; Anderson, 1982; Plourde and Smith, 1989; Platteau 
and Nugent, 1992), constituting the primary remuneration system for all types of fishing, from industrial 
European trawlers to artisanal fisheries in the developing world (Firth, 1966; Alexander, 1982; Platteau 
and Balland, 1989; Béné, 1997). The fishery of Lake Nasser in Egypt is no exception. The remuneration of 
nearly all of the 8000 fishers of this small-scale fishery is at least partially determined by share contracts.  
Four main categories of contracts can be identified, of which three apply to roasa. Those contracts – 
which we propose to call ‘owners’, ‘renters’, and ‘partners’ contracts – differ from each other by the 
contractual arrangements through which the roasa access licenses, and to a lesser extent their ownership 
of boats and gear. Fishers in the fourth category, called ‘labourers’, work for one raeis (the singular of 
roasa), living in his camp, and using his boats, gear, and licenses. The features distinguishing the four 
contracts are detailed below, along with calculations of net income. 
 
Owners: Owners own licenses (hence the name), boats, and gear, and bear all operating costs except for 
the portion that they share with the crew through the payment of net shares. While they fish (unlike 
licenselords), they must hire additional labour power in order to be able to put their equipment and 
license(s) to productive use. In algebraic terms, their net income (IO) can be written as: 
 
IO = (1 - p). (X – C – Z - f)    (1) 
Where X is the gross value of the catch, C is operating costs such as fuel, gear, and maintenance, Z is the 
allowances paid to the crew, f is the annual license feeiv, and p is the crew’s share, typically 50 per cent. 
The owner category is also the most homogenous of the roasa, exhibiting the least intracategory variation 
in fleet size, investment, and production (see Table 2). 
 
Renters: Renters are professional fishers who typically own boats and gear, but do not own licenses. Like 
owners, they need to hire labourers, but they also need to lease a license, and in some cases to access 
money for capital investments. They rent licenses from licenselords, paying a fixed annual rent per license 
R, and their income (IR) can be written as: 
IR = (1 – p). (X – C – Z - R)    (2) 
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They are totally independent from the license lord except for rent payments R. The license lord does not 
provide any supervision nor does he participate in investment and strategy decisions. As rent is paid as a 
fixed amount, the license lord does not share operating costs either, though in some cases renters may 
jointly purchase boats or gear with their license lord. The data indicate that renters tend to be younger 
and more educated than other fishersv (Table 2). 
 
Partners: Like renters, partners are professional fishers who do not own licenses. They often own boats 
and gear, though slightly less frequently than renters do. The majority of partners share both costs and 
revenues with the license lord; though some of them (‘none cost sharing’ partners) share only revenues 
with the license lord. The rest of the partners (‘cost sharing partners’) own boats and gear, although it is 
not uncommon for them to share ownership of one or both with the license lord. They must hire 
labourers, lease a license, and access money for operating costs and in some cases capital investment. 
They share operational costs ‘upward’ with the license lord through the payment of license rent as a share 
of net income rather than gross, and ‘downward’ with labourers. If we let r be the share of net income 
paid to the license lord (nearly always 50%), their income (IP) can be written as: 
 
                                       IP = (1 – p). [(1 – R). (X – C - Z)]             (3) 
‘None cost sharing’ partners on the other hand do not share costs ‘upward’ with licenselords, only 
‘downward’ with labourers. Their license rent r* is calculated as a share of gross income (between 10 and 
35%). The income (IP*) of the non cost sharing partner can be written as:  
 
IP*= (1 – p). (X – C – Z – r*X)    (4) 
Licenselords are much more involved with cost sharing partners than with non cost sharing partners or 
renters, participating in investment and strategy decisions, and visiting fishing camps regularly to 
supervise operations and bring food and supplies. 
From the above, we can see that owners and renters have an ‘upwards’ rental contract, where they pay a 
fixed rent or fee for the license, and a ‘downwards’ share contract, where they hire labourers whom they 
pay on a share basis. Partners, one the other hand, have two share contracts - one with the labourers, and 
one with the license lord. In this sense, partners are ‘share workers’ vis-à-vis the license lord in addition 
to being roasa vis-à-vis their labourers. As is clear from the algebraic analysis in this section, however, 
partners have more in common with the other roasa than they do with labourers. This will be revisited in 
more detail in the section on incentives and supervision below. 
 
Labourers: The last group is the ‘labourers’. Labourers do not own boats or gear, and do not own or lease 
licenses. They possess only their own labour power, and work for a raeis who provides them with 
equipment and (access to) licenses in order to fish. They are paid their share at the end of the fishing 
season, and are provided with food while in the fishing camp, the cost of which is subtracted from gross 
income along with other costs before shares are calculated. The net income (IL) of the crew (as a whole) 
can be written as: 
IL = p. (X – C – L - Z) + Z     (5) 
As above, X is the gross value of the catch, C is the operating costs, Z is the allowances paid to the 
labourers, and p is the labour share, typically 50 per cent. L represents the amount that the raeis pays for 
the license – in the form of an annual license fee, a fixed rent, or a share of the catch, depending on what 
type of contract he has. The crew income is then shared, usually evenly, amongst all the labourers in the 
camp. Note that this labourers’ remuneration (5) is consistent with that described in the literature on 
share contracts in fishing. Sutinen (1979) demonstrated that when both crew and equipment owners (in 
our case the roasa) are risk averse, owners prefer mixed share/wage contracts, in which the crew’s 
income consists of a share of the catch (here p . (X – C – L - Z)) plus a fixed wage component (here Z). In 
developing countries, this fixed wage component often consists of a customary quantity of fish for home 
consumption, food and drink while fishing, or a cash allowance for tea, cigarettes and snacks (Platteau 
and Nugent, 1992). In Lake Nasser, the fixed component consists of fish for their consumption and meals 
while they are in the fishing camp, but not a cash allowance. 
 
Functions of share contracts: The use of share contracts in agriculture has been the subject of much 
debate in the theoretical literature. Overall, the quest for explanations of what was once termed the 
‘paradoxical pervasiveness of share contracts’ (Platteau and Nugent, 1992:386) revolves around two 
main functions and their implications for efficiency: (1) managing risk, in particular in the absence of 
insurance markets, and (2) reducing moral hazard in the absence of close supervision and providing 
incentives for higher production and optimal use of resources.  
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Risk Management: The first important function served by share contracts is that of risk management. 
While the use of share contracts to manage agricultural risk has been much discussed, risk management 
is arguably even more important in fishing, as fishing is a particularly risky occupation. Indeed, in 
addition to production and price risks (as in agriculture), there is also the ever present possibility that a 
fisher could lose all of his productive assets (and possibly his life) within the span of a few minutes 
(McGoodwin, 2001). Platteau and Nugent (1992) identify three main types of risk in fisheries: production 
risk deriving from fluctuations in catch, price risk from fluctuations in markets, and risk of loss or damage 
of assets (including injury or loss of life).  
 
While there is little that can be done to reduce many of the risks faced by fishers, the use of share 
contracts described above enables risk of all three types to be shared through multiple links in the 
contract chain, thereby reducing the risk borne by each individualvi. Production risk, for example, is 
largely due to factors beyond the control of fishers (such as weather, luck, water levels, and the natural 
productivity of the lake), and there is little that they can do to reduce it. In Lake Nasser, production costs 
and therefore risk are shared through at least two levels of the contract chain, leaving no single actor 
responsible for meeting all fishing costs in the event of poor landings. In the case of cost sharing partners, 
the risk is shared between three links of the chain (labourers, roasa, and licenselords).  
 
Price risk in Lake Nasser is managed much the same way as production risk, though until recently it was 
limited by a pricing system in which the price of fresh fish was fixed fortnightly by a committee created 
especially for this purposevii. The fixed prices were below national market rates, and fish from Lake 
Nasser were typically sold in Cairo at a lower price than farmed or Nile caught fish of the same species. 
This system applied only to fresh fish, while the price of salted fish was determined by the market 
(Barranaia, 2000)viii. In addition, a trader rota allowed only one of the six official private fish traders for 
each harbour to buy the landings each day.  Fishers who targeted Nile perch, tilapia, and other fresh fish 
were therefore subject to production and loss/damage risk, but largely insulated from price risk. Only 
fishers who targeted tiger fish and Alestes spp to process and sell as salted fish were subject to all three 
types of riskix. A free market system was introduced in August 2008, and as all fish are now sold at market 
rates, it can be assumed that all fishers are now subject to price risk. 
 
While risk of injury or death is obviously borne by each individual fisherx, risk of loss or damage to boats 
and gear is managed in a similar manner as price and production risk – through payment in net shares. 
When shares are calculated at the end of the season, repair and replacement costs are included in the 
operational costs which are deducted from gross production, and are therefore shared by all actors who 
earn a portion of net proceeds. Owners, renters and non cost sharing partners share these costs (and 
therefore the associated risk) with their labourers, while cost sharing partners share them with both 
labourers and licenselords. This arrangement is not only a mechanism for sharing loss/damage risk, but 
also a strong incentive for the crew to take good care of the boat and nets, as they are partially 
responsible for the cost of any damage. In addition to roasa sharing risk downwards with labourers 
through the use of share contracts, this risk is also spread amongst the labourers, as shares are calculated 
as a percentage of net profit for the whole camp over the season. Seasonal rather than daily payment 
smoothes fluctuations in income due to weather and luck, and collective payment ensures that no 
labourer bears more risk than the others in the fishing camp.  
 
 Stiglitz (1974) argued, however, that risk sharing alone is not sufficient to explain the persistence of 
share contracts. He claimed that it is possible to achieve the same risk sharing benefits through a mix of 
wage and rental contracts, assuming that both workers and landlords can mix contracts. However, while 
it might be theoretically possible for landlords to subdivide their land and efficiently allocate parcels 
between rental and wage contracts, the assumption that workers can choose to work for many landlords 
simultaneously on a mix of rental and wage contracts is more difficult to envisage, particularly in fishing 
where workers often live in an isolated fishing camp or on a boat at sea with no option for physical 
mobility between employers. Furthermore, while land can be split into plots of any size, a boat or license 
cannot (Platteau and Nugent, 1992). Transferring this discussion to the case of the Lake Nasser fishery 
where labourers work for one raeis for the entire season and partners and renters lease licenses from one 
license lord on an annual basis, we see that the required assumption of both workers and landlords 
(labourers and roasa respectively, or partners/renters and licenselords, depending on which relationship 
is being examined) being free to mix contracts is clearly not met here.  
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4. Incentives and Supervision 
 
In parallel to the discussion on risk, a large part of the debate in the sharecropping literature revolves 
around whether sharecropping provides positive or negative incentives for production. Adam Smith 
considered it a ‘tax’ that prevented optimal investment in the land, and later authors such as Marshall 
(1890) argued that it not only prevented long term investment, but was also a disincentive to intensive 
cultivation and provision of inputs in adequate quantities in the short term, as the tenant was only able to 
keep half of what he produced. Some more contemporary authors (Newbery, 1977; Newbery and Stiglitz, 
1979) have taken the opposite position, arguing that one of the main benefits of share contracts is the 
positive incentives that they provide where supervision is difficult or costly and effort is unverifiable. 
 
McConnell and Price (2006) extend this argument to fisheries, questioning the pure risk sharing 
explanation that Sutinen (1979) and Plourde and Smith (1989) proposed. They argue instead for an 
explanation based on moral hazard and team agency, claiming that share contracts reduce incentives for 
shirking when effort is unobservable or difficult to measure. Catch levels depend on factors such as 
weather, fluctuating fish stocks, and skill in addition to effort, making it very difficult for asset owners to 
distinguish shirking from bad luck and the effort of one crew member from another. By paying crew in 
shares, asset owners are able to discourage shirking, as crew directly benefit from providing extra effort.  
Platteau and Nugent (1992) identify labour shirking, asset mismanagement, output underreporting, input 
overreporting, and quality shirking as the main types of opportunistic behaviour to which fishing is 
vulnerable. In Lake Nasser, one can hypothesise that the incentives and opportunities for each of these 
will vary by contract type. The focus here will be on partners and labourers, as these are the two groups 
who can be considered ‘share workers’ – partners vis-à-vis licenselords, paying a share of their proceeds 
for use of the license, and labourers’ vis-à-vis roasa, receiving a share of the proceeds for their work. 
While both are share workers, significant differences emerge when comparing the two contract types.  
 
Partners are roasa, and, as such, are largely responsible for investment and strategy decisions. They can 
increase production (and therefore their own income) not only by eliciting additional effort from their 
crews, but also by investing in additional equipment or changing fishing strategy. But they are also share 
workers vis-à-vis their license lord (see equations (3) and (4) above). As such, they are prone to the 
incentive problems identified by early critics of agricultural sharecropping – if the marginal productivity 
gain from a given investment, input, or additional unit of effort is not substantially greater than the cost of 
the investment, it is not in the share worker’s interest (Schickele, 1941). We could therefore expect this 
type of contract to be subject to a higher degree of labour and input shirking than a rental contract 
(Marshall 1890). Labourers, on the other hand, have no room for entrepreneurial decision making. Their 
contract is essentially an employment contract, while that of the partners is more of a joint venture 
between principals (Roumasset and Uy, 1987). While payment in shares constitutes a disincentive 
compared to rental contracts, it is an incentive compared to wage contracts, and this is the appropriate 
comparison here.  
 
The small share size labourers receive could be seen as providing an incentive for higher production, as it 
requires them to work hard to earn even a small wage, paralleling the use of plot size to control effort in 
agriculture (Johnson, 1950; Cheung, 1969; Bhaduri, 1983; Braverman and Srinivasan, 1981). Indeed, 
labourers both carry out more fishing operations per week (Fig.1) and catch more per boat than any 
other category (Fig.2). While this incentive for higher production should apply in theory to all of the 
fishers whose income is calculated on a share basis (i.e. the roasa as well), the small share size received 
by the labourers means that extra income obtained through extra effort could be critical to maintaining a 
subsistence level of income. The ratio of their marginal utility of income to marginal disutility of effort is 
substantially higher than that of the roasa, whose income is safely above the subsistence level.  
 
While it may seem strange that share contracts can be convincingly argued to be both an incentive (for 
labourers) and a deterrent (for partners) to increased production, looking at it this way makes it clear 
that partners and labourers have very different contracts, despite both being paid in shares. There are 
major differences in how much capital they control, what they are expected to contribute, how much risk 
they bear, and the degree of autonomy they have. Taslim (1992) applies a similar distinction to the 
agricultural sharecropping debate: cropshare tenants, analogous to partners, have significant autonomy 
and responsibility, while sharecroppers, analogous to labourers, are ‘merely wage labourer[s] whose 
wage consists of a share of the output instead of a fixed sum.’ (Taslim, 1992:260). He argues that the two 
sides of the sharecropping efficiency debate have been talking about two different types of contracts: 
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cropshare tenancy, claimed to be inefficient (Smith, 1776; Marshall, 1890; Schickele, 1941), and 
sharecropping, claimed to be efficient (Cheung, 1969; Reid, 1976).  
 
Figure 1: Average number of fishing operations per week 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average catch per boat (kg) 
 
 
 
 
Access to Factors of Production: While incentives may be a relevant factor in contract choice, and risk 
sharing almost certainly is, these are not sufficient to account for the diversity of contracts present in the 
fishery. This diversity is likely to be a result of diversity among the fishers themselves, as fishers who 
possess different types of productive resources have different requirements for what they need in a 
contract (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986; Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Laffont and Matoussi, 
1995). If all roasa owned boats and gear, a relatively simple combination of one form of roasa-labourer 
contract and one form of roasa-license lord contract could achieve the risk sharing and incentive 
functions discussed above. The reality is more complicated, however, and this mix of contracts allows 
roasa not only to lease licenses and labour power, but also offers a variety of options for acquiring boats 
and gear, mobilizing capital for investment and operating costs in the absence of credit markets, and 
managing risk in the absence of insurance markets.  
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Access to capital is likely to be a key factor influencing contract choice among roasa. Lack of credit has 
been recurrently identified as a constraint to the development of small and micro enterprises in Egypt 
(UNDP, 2004; ENCC, 2006) and formal finance is often limited and fails to reach the poor (IFAD, 2005; 
Zeller and Sharma, 1998), with land ownership typically required as collateral for rural loans (Mohieldin 
and Wright, 2000; Kruseman and Vullings, 2007). Roasa therefore must either have enough cash to cover 
investment and operational costs or access informal credit through their licenselords. Those with less 
capital are limited to contract types which either do not require them to meet these costs upfront or those 
which give them access to informal sources of credit. Laffont and Matoussi (1995) describe a similar 
pattern among Tunisian sharecroppers, with working capital shaping contract choice and accounting for 
the coexistence of a range of contractual forms. While a detailed analysis of the assets of each fisher is 
beyond the scope of this study, we can identify some broad trends from the data which give us a general 
idea of the ways fishers in different categories access capital. Owners appear to have the most resources 
of any of the categories. In addition to owning a license, nearly all of themxi own their own boats and gear, 
and they must have enough cash available to cover their operating costs. They also target tiger fish and 
Alestes spp. for salting more frequently than other categories do, which requires the use of powered boats 
and expensive specialised gearxii, and could be another indication that they tend to be wealthier. 
 
Renters also need to have cash available for initial operating costs, though many have the option to share 
gear or boat purchases with licenselords, and some work with partners instead of owning their own 
equipment. While a few renters report controlling a large number of licenses (up to 26) in their fishing 
camp, three out of the top five do not own the boats associated with those licenses, and a fourth shares 
ownership with the license lord. Most of those who own boats outright have just one or two. They have 
the least gear per boat of any category, which could further indicate that they have less money available 
for investment, as fewer of them purchase gear in conjunction with licenselords, and they are responsible 
for a larger share of the operating costs. Even though this contract allows for less risk sharing than a 
partner contract, it gives them more independence, both in determining their strategy and in keeping 
additional income that may come from a particularly good fishing season. This is consistent with the 
observation that renters are younger and more educated than other roasa, and may find this 
independence more appealing despite the risks that go with it. 
 
Partners, on the other hand, have more gear per boat than other roasa, and handle the largest fleets. This 
may be attributable to many of them opting to share ownership of boats and gear with licenselords, as 
those partners who share ownership appear to be in charge of more boats (17 average v. 6) with more 
gear per boat than those who own all their equipment. Even those partners who own both boats and gear 
tend to have more boats (6 average v. 4) and more gear per boat than renters who also own boats and 
gear. It is plausible that some of the money which would otherwise be spent on operating costs is 
available to them for investment, allowing them to purchase additional gear and boats. This is the roasa 
contract with the most risk sharing, as risk is spread between all three layers of the contract chain 
(licenselords, roasa, and labourers).  
 
We can therefore see how these contracts enable roasa to combine the resources that they control (boats, 
gear, and often limited capital) with resources controlled by other actors. Many partners and some 
renters access capital through their license lord to invest in boats and nets, and the majority of partnersxiii 
also use this relationship to partially cover their operating costs. It could even be argued that the deferral 
of payment to labourers until the end of the fishing season also constitutes a de facto form of informal 
credit for roasa, as they can use this money to cover interim costs as long as they are able to pay when 
required. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The existence of share contracts in agriculture has been the subject of an intense debate in economic 
literature for many decades. While different reasons for this pervasiveness (spreading of risk between 
agents, limitation of moral hazard) have been considered, a large part of the debate has been framed 
around the relative efficiency of share contracts compared to other types of contract. Indeed, much of the 
discussion about risk management and moral hazard has revolved around their implications for 
efficiency. The search for a type of contract that is inherently more efficient than others may however 
have obscured the fact that in many cases, the socially efficient outcome involves a mix of contract types 
to suit the production needs of a whole range of different actors. In practice, share contracts take so many 
diverse forms with so many different outcomes that it is difficult to decisively say whether they are 
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inherently more or less efficient than other types of contracts. What appears clear, however, is that these 
contracts fulfil a range of important functions that enable or facilitate production in specific contexts. In a 
situation such as this one where multiple forms of contract coexist, the relevant question may be not 
‘which of those contracts is the most efficient?’ but ‘what purpose do they serve for the people who are 
engaged in them?’ Rather than being the explanatory variable, contract type, along with other dependent 
variables such as strategy and investment decisions, might actually be a result of agents’ initial capital and 
resource endowments: the differences in the resources which each type of actor possesses shape which 
strategies and investments are available to him and which contract type will allow him to access the 
remaining necessary factors of production.  
 
More broadly, through this understanding of the wide range of actors which exist in real world 
economies, we have tried to shed some light on the much debated question of not only why share 
contracts continue to be used in so many contexts, but why they so often co exist under various (and 
sometimes relatively complex) contractual forms. Particularly in developing countries, interlinking of 
markets is common, and contracts (formal or informal) are often much more than simply arrangements 
for hiring labour or obtaining use of land or other productive resources. They often also compensate in 
various ways for underdeveloped or nonexistent capital and insurance markets, and as such, contract 
design varies according to the degree that mechanisms for accessing capital or managing risk are 
included in it. This enables actors to access the productive factors which they do not own, and facilitates 
production in contexts where it would otherwise be much more difficult.  
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Endnotes 
                                               
i The lake spreads in both Egypt (300 km) and Sudan (190 km). The continuation of the lake in Sudan is called the 
Lake Nubia. 
ii The lake is characterised by a high primary productivity due to the millions of tonnes of the Nile’s silts that slowly 
sediment in the southern part of the lake.  
iii Crul and Roest (1995) estimated potential production at 80,000 t a year 
iv License fees vary depending on the characteristics of the boat, but they are typically less than EGP 100 (USD $18) 
per year. 
v Given that the average age the fishermen surveyed began fishing is the same for all categories (17-18), it is possible 
that rental contracts may be gradually replacing partner contracts among the ‘new generation’ of non license-owning 
roasa, though it is not clear whether this is their choice or imposed by licenselords 
vi It is worth pointing out, however, that those share contracts do not offer any risk sharing advantage for labourers, 
as they are forced to bear more risk than they would under a pure wage contract. 
vii This committee is chaired by the chief of the harbor and composed of representatives of the Governorate of Aswan, 
LNDA, the Ministry of Supply, the cooperatives as well as the chamber of commerce. 
viii For a detailed description of this particular case and its political economy analysis, refer to Béné et al. (2008). 
ix Some fishermen sold their fish on the black market to fish smugglers rather than at fixed prices in the official 
harbors, and they would also have been subject to price risk.  
x In Lake Nasser, aside from the typical risks of death or injury common to many types of fishing, there are also 1000 - 
1500 Nile crocodiles in the lake who pose an additional risk to fishers (LNDA, personal communication). 
xi One person (2%) owns a boat but not gear, and one person owns gear but not a boat. The remaining 96% own both. 
xii To buy and equip a boat for targeting these fish costs approximately EGP 25,000 (USD $4500), while a boat and 
gear for tilapia costs approximately EGP 5000 (USD $900) 
xiii Cost-sharing partners who pay their license lease as a share of net revenues instead of gross revenues.  
